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Pricing data reﬂect multiple decisions (e.g., regular pricing and discounting) often made by multiple
decision makers. For example, temporary price reductions (high frequency price changes) can be
used to price discriminate in the short run, while regular price adjustments (low frequency price
changes) reﬂect more strategic or long-term goals. It is therefore possible that the “reaction” of one
brand’s price to another depends on the frequency of the data analysed. Time disaggregation does
not remedy this problem, because frequency aggregation exists even when data are analyzed at the
lowest possible level of temporal aggregation. This paper therefore decomposes pricing interactions
across multiple frequencies or planning cycles. Using weekly sku-level price data in 37 grocery cate-
gories, we shed some light on the nature of pricing interactions across alternative planning horizons.
We ﬁnd that cross-brand correlation in prices occurs at multiple planning horizons, and that the
planning horizon of the predominant interaction does typically not coincide with the sampling rate
of the data. We next demonstrate that diﬀerent conclusions about the nature of price competition
emerge from diﬀerent periodicities of pricing data by applying a structural model of competitive
price responses to diﬀerent price periodicities identiﬁed by spectral decomposition. Calibrated on
short-term price variation, the model indicates that pricing among brands is cooperative, whereas
the long-term price variation suggests independent or Nash competitive behavior. We provide al-
ternative interpretations for this ﬁnding and we conclude that price periodicity matters for the
inference of competitive response.
Keywords: Competition; Competitive Reactions; Price Reactions; Spectral Analysis; Time
Series; Vector Autoregression; Empirical Generalizations; Long-term Eﬀects.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Empirical research pertaining to the measurement and prediction of competitors’ price interactions
is pervasive in the marketing literature (e.g., Gatignon 1984; Hanssens 1980; Lambin, Naert, and
Bultez 1975). More recently, considerable attention has been devoted to the dynamics inherent in
competitor price interactions (Dekimpe and Hanssens 1999; Leeﬂang and Wittink 1992, 1996, 2001;
Nijs et al. 2001, Steenkamp et al. 2004). These papers have led to a richer view of competition,
engendering the view that response may occur with some delay.
Our aim is to contribute to this literature by considering how inferences regarding pricing in-
teractions vary across diﬀerent periodicities in pricing data. Weekly pricing data, for example,
may embed both regular price decisions (which may change on an infrequent basis) and tempo-
rary price reductions (which may occur more frequently). Though these multiple decisions are
agglomerated into a single pricing series, the goals of short-term and long-term pricing decisions,
as well as consumer response to them, may be diﬀerent. For example, a manufacturer might use
discounts to (1) collude against weaker brands (Lal 1990), (2) exploit asymmetries in price response
around a reference price (Greenleaf 1995), (3) price discriminate among brand switchers (Farris and
Quelch 1987), (4) increase consumption, (5) induce trial, or (6) meet quarterly goals. In contrast,
regular price changes might reﬂect (1) changes in overall cost structure, (2) a signal of quality,
or (3) a drive toward increased proﬁtability. Retailers, likewise, might choose to use discounts
for purposes of (1) category management, (2) price discrimination among store switchers, or (3)
shifting inventory costs to consumers (Blattberg and Eppen and Lieberman 1981). Moreover, the
timing of pricing decisions can diﬀer across agents. Manufacturers, for instance, can react to each
other’s regular price changes, as the rate of price change for regular prices is suﬃciently slow that
manufacturers have the opportunity to observe and react to such changes. From discussions with
manufacturers, we note that it usually takes 6 months or more to implement a price change into
retail (see also Chintagunta, Dube and Singh 2002; Kopalle, Mela and Marsh 1999). In contrast,
short-term changes in price often occur too quickly for manufacturers to respond (Leeﬂang and
Wittink 1992).1 Therefore, it stands to reason that observed pricing interactions may vary across
frequencies and that aggregating these across frequencies obscures insights regarding the nature of
1An exception to this generalization exists when manufacturers can obtain competitive dealing schedules from
their retailers well in advance of the deals.
1price interactions.
Further substantiating this argument in the context of modeling competition in prices, Kadiyali,
Sudhir, and Rao (2001, p. 177) note that “periodicity of decision making and time aggrega-
tion/disaggregation are important issues to bear in mind.” They suggest additional research is
needed in this area. In this context, we propose an exploratory approach to identify the planning
cycles (or periodicities) at which, empirically, prices interact across brands. Using this approach,
we next test the conjecture that considering alternative planning cycles in pricing data changes
inferences regarding price competition and ﬁnd that this is indeed the case. In light of this ﬁnding,
we argue that it is desirable to decompose the data into planning cycles and then let theory inform
the modeler which frequency is most germane to the pricing decision of interest. For example, if the
aim is to ascertain competitors’ responses to promotion we would select diﬀerent, and presumably
shorter, planning cycles than if we wanted to see whether the data inform us about the competition
in regular prices.
The following example illustrates how measures of price interactions depend on planning cycles.
For illustrative purposes, we focus on correlation between prices of diﬀerent brands as a measure
of price interaction. This measure is purely descriptive. However, if competitors respond to each
other’s price changes, one expects such reactions to manifest themselves as a statistical relation
between observed prices.2 Consider Figure 1 which depicts more than 4 years of retail price per
can for two brands of beer in a Dominick’s Finer Food store in Chicago.
–––— insert Figure 1 here –––—
The contemporaneous correlation among the price residuals is -0.05 (not signiﬁcant) for the
data in Figure 1. However, as is clear from the graph, there are multiple frequencies represented in
the price data. First, there exist high-frequency oscillations in short-term pricing (occurring every
ﬁve weeks or so). Pricing at this periodicity appears indicative of temporary price reductions. For
these frequencies, the correlation in residuals is −0.26 (t = −3.56), implying a contemporaneous
negative interaction. To the extent short-term price variation is retailer driven, this would suggest
that the retailers tend to promote an alternate weeks (Krishna 1994). Second, there exist lower
frequency price ﬂuctuations (occurring every 15 weeks or so), perhaps associated with longer-term
2Correlation in the temporal domain is sensitive to whether a competitor interacts with some delay or not. We
later propose a frequency based correlation measure that remains unaﬀected by response delays.
2movements in regular price. If one focuses on these long-term variations in prices, the correlation
is 0.96 (t =4 5 .36), reﬂecting changes in regular price (possibly reﬂecting changes in costs or other
factors common across ﬁrms).3 Thus, inasmuch as these estimates are taken to be reﬂective of
competitive interaction, diﬀerent conclusions regarding the nature of competitors’ price interactions
are drawn by looking at diﬀerent planning horizons.
In sum, our objectives in this paper are to (1) empirically characterize the degree to which
price interactions occur at diﬀerent periodicities, (2) provide some insight about their dependence
on decision horizons and on category and brand characteristics, (3) show that inferred competitor
price interactions depend on the periodicity of the pricing data. The spectral approach employed
in this paper complements econometric and economic analyses in the time domain (e.g., VAR
and NEIO, respectively). Further, the issue of periodicity aggregation is very distinct from time
aggregation (Leone 1995). Even when data are disaggregated to the shortest data interval, multiple
decision makers and multiple decisions remain combined in the data. Indeed, as data are sampled at
higher frequencies (e.g., weekly vs. monthly), more interactions become intermingled in the pricing
series. As such, the literature on time aggregation provides limited insights into the periodicity
of decision making. In contrast, our analysis seeks to inform the modeler about the frequency or
periodicity in which the price interactions occur.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the methods used to illustrate our points.
Section 3 discusses the data and Section 4 presents the results of the analysis. A key ﬁnding is that
empirically the periodicity of price interactions generally diﬀers from the sampling rate of the data.
In Section 5, we explore further implications of our ﬁndings by showing that the frequency of price
interactions can aﬀect statistical inferences regarding the nature of price competition. Section 6
concludes the paper.
2M e t h o d
To assess the inﬂuence of periodicity on competition, we employ a spectral decomposition of price
series. This analysis is purely descriptive and is intended to show how the magnitude and direction
of price interactions depend on frequencies, which we denote “planning horizons.” In a second
3For this illustration, we isolated the short (long) term variation in the data, by using a high (low) pass ﬁlter
which eliminates variation below or above quarterly frequencies.
3stage analysis, we use regression methods to determine how the magnitude and direction of price
interactions depend on a variety of brand and category level variables.
2.1 Spectral decomposition of price covariation
Spectral analysis is a technique that creates a (co)variance decomposition of data (e.g., price) into
diﬀerent planning cycles or frequencies. For this and other reasons, spectral analysis has been
widely applied in economics and ﬁnance (e.g., Andersen and Bollerslev 1997). However, it has been
used only rarely in marketing (Chatﬁeld 1974). We use a multivariate spectral decomposition to
analyze the competitive price series in many diﬀerent product categories. The methods for doing
this are well-documented (e.g., Hamilton 1994) and therefore we relegate the technical aspects of
the analysis to an appendix (Appendix A). To measure whether price covariation is present across
frequencies, we compute the coherence at each frequency.
Coherence is equal to the squared correlation coeﬃcient for two or more series of data at a
speciﬁc frequency (Hassler 1993). Hence, in the context of pricing data, coherence is equal to
the squared correlation coeﬃcient for pairs of competing prices at a particular planning horizon
` (e.g., weeks, months, quarters). The coherence values range from 0 (no interaction between
two competitors at planning horizon `) to 1 (very strong interaction at `). If the coherence is
close to 0 at a planning horizon of 3 months, price changes for one brand occurring at 3 month
intervals are uncorrelated with those from another brand. In contrast, a coherence close to 1 at the
monthly level indicates strong price interactions occurring at roughly 4 week intervals. Importantly,
coherence measures the presence of correlation in prices at a particular planning cycle, regardless
of whether competitor price interactions are instantaneous or lagged. This attractive property
ensures that there is no confound between price reactions and the timing of those reactions. For
purposes of notation, let hc
ii0(ω) denote coherence for the prices of brand pair {i,i} in category c,




As an example, Figure 2 portrays the coherence between Budweiser and Old Milwaukee es-
timated using the data in Figure 1 and controlling for the other brands’ prices (i.e., the pricing
analysis is multivariate). The horizontal axis depicts the pricing cycle, or planning horizon (in
weeks), and ranges from a low of 200 weeks and a high of 2 weeks (2 weeks implies 26 price cycles
4per year — as prices are set weekly, the shortest complete price cycle for weekly data, and thus
highest frequency observable in the data is biweekly).4 The vertical axis is coherence. The obser-
vations in Figure 2 represent the 5%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 95% percentiles in the distribution of
the coherence estimates in the beer category at each planning horizon (the methodological section
outlines the procedure for estimating these percentiles).
Three areas of high coherence between Budweiser and Old Milwaukee are indicated. First, the
highest coherence occurs at cycles of roughly 5 weeks (monthly cycles). The high-frequency price
changes evidenced in Figure 1 occur at this periodicity. Second, Figure 2 details strong coherence in
pricing for price cycles of approximately 15 weeks (quarterly). A comparison of the top and bottom
graphs in Figure 1 suggests that the slower moving regular price shifts are common to both brands,
and that longer-term coherence in pricing may be present. Finally, there is a strong biweekly
pricing cycle, reﬂective of weekly price changes indicated in Figure 1. Hence, the interaction of
prices between Budweiser and Old Milwaukee contains at least three empirically important planning
horizons, and coherence captures them all.
–––— insert Figure 2 here –––—
In addition to coherence, multivariate spectral analysis provides two other descriptive measures
of the statistical interaction of two time series of prices stemming from the polar representation
of their spectrum (e.g., Hamilton 1994, p. 275). The ﬁrst of these measures is called phase. This
metric captures whether prices tend to move in the same direction or in opposite directions. As
with coherence, phase is speciﬁc to the planning horizon ω. The value of the phase lies between −π
and +π radians. A phase of 0 implies that prices change concurrently, or “in-phase.” Such series
are positively correlated. A phase of ±π indicate that prices are perfectly “out-of-phase.” Such
series are negatively correlated. Figure 2’s short-term price interactions (approximately 5 weeks)
between Budweiser and Old Milwaukee have a phase close to +π, indicating that prices are out of
phase in the short-term (indicating that the promotions of these brands are negatively correlated).
However, the peak in coherence corresponding to approximately 15 weeks evidence a phase very
close to 0. As such, it appears that prices move together in the long term, but disparately in
4It is noted that cycles (or periods) and frequencies are inversely related. That is letting ` denote the length of the
price cycle (counted in time units), and ω denote frequency (expressed in radians), the relationship between planning
period and frequency can then be expressed as ` =( 2 π/ω), 0 < ω ≤ π (see also Harvey 1975).
5the short term. These two facts accord with the price series in Figure 1. The second measure,
called gain, is harder to interpret but seeks to express the attenuation of one price by another at
a particular frequency. Statistically, its interpretation is similar to the magnitude of a regression
coeﬃcient (Brillinger 1981). In the example of Budweiser and Old Milwaukee, Figure 1 suggests
the price variation of each of these brands is roughly equal, thus it is not surprising that we ﬁnd
the gain for the short-term and long-term price cycles are both close to 1.
In this paper, we limit our attention to the analysis of coherence for two key reasons. First, our
goal is to determine the periodicity at which pricing interactions occur, as this determination is a
useful precursor to analyses of pricing competition — and coherence is the only measure related to
this objective. Second, coherence is a prerequisite for analyzing other metrics such as phase and
gain. Phase and gain have little meaning when coherence is small or insigniﬁcant.
2.2 Regression
The next step of our analysis assesses whether competitor interactions, as measured by coherence,
systematically vary across planning horizons. To proceed with this analysis, we follow several steps,
outlined below:
1. Categorize the continuous periodicities (ω) into a discrete number of planning horizons
(p = {0,1,2}). Following Leeﬂang and Wittink (1992), we deﬁne short-term reactions as those that
occur at intervals of 4 weeks or less (monthly). Leeﬂang and Wittink (1992; 2001) note that this
cutoﬀ corresponds roughly with the period in which manufacturers can not adequately respond
to observed changes in retail price activity. We denote medium-term as those reactions that occur
between the 4 week period and 13 week (quarterly) period. Such price movements are more likely
to include manufacturer reactions to competitors’ discounting policies, and may include changes in
regular price. We deﬁne price changes that occur at greater than a quarterly frequency as longer-
term, and these may be more reﬂective of longer term strategic objectives. Finally, we disregard
price changes that occur with a periodicity of more than 26 weeks to ensure a suﬃcient number of
cycles to produce a reliable analysis. In addition, avoiding annual cycles in prices reduces the risk
of inadvertently confusing positive covariation in prices due to common seasonality in costs with
positive covariation because of strategic long term price matching.
2. Compute the representative coherence for each planning horizon. Within each planning
6horizon (short, medium, long) there exist multiple coherences, so the problem of selecting the most
representative coherence becomes germane. For each planning cycle, we select across all member-
frequencies the highest ratio of coherence to its standard deviation.5 In other words, the criterion
for the presence of price interaction at any frequency range is that coherence should be important
for at least one frequency that is considered part of that range. For example, the characteristic
short term coherence is that for which
max








ii0(ω)) are the mean and standard deviation of the sampling draws
at of the coherence at planning cycle ω (see Appendix A). We maximize this ratio for each of the
three planning horizons (short, medium, and long) to select the representative coherence in each of
these planning horizons.
The procedure of selecting the characteristic coherences within a planning horizon can be il-
lustrated by referencing Figure 2. Among all the short run ω’s the ratio of mean coherence to its
standard deviation for Budweiser-Old Milwaukee is highest at 2.1 weeks for the short run. Thus
the representative coherence for that price pair in the short run is the coherence at 2.1 weeks.
Continuing this logic, the medium term coherence corresponds to the mean coherence at 4.9 weeks,
and the long-term coherence corresponds to the mean coherence at 15.4 weeks. Although this ex-
ample contains sizable coherence in all three planning horizons, the subsequent sections show that,
empirically, this is not the case in general.
3. Regress planning horizon, brand and category characteristics on coherence
Using regression analysis, we investigate whether there are important diﬀerences in coherence
across pairs of brands, across categories, and across planning horizons. Knowledge of these diﬀer-
ences is useful in predicting when periodicity matters (in terms of making inferences about compet-
itive pricing interactions). Appendix B provides details regarding the speciﬁcation and estimation
of the regression model. We note that the regression takes into account unobserved heterogeneity
in brand pairs and in categories.
5In addition to the highest formulation, we tried a weighted average formulation, wherein the mean coherences
were weighted by their variances and summed across the planning cycle. The results were essentially identical.
73D a t a
We use the Dominick’s Finer Foods (dff) data base for this research.6 The dff data are comprised
of 7 years of weekly store movement data, and are thus well suited to study longer-term variation in
retail prices. The dff data contain 29 categories, although many of these categories contain multiple
subcategories (e.g., grooming products contain razors, shaving cream, and deodorant among other
sub-categories). In total, we conducted spectral analyses on 37 subcategories.7 From the many
upcs within a category, we select the most important ones for analysis, deﬁned as those that had
both high levels of demand within the category and a long duration in the data. When possible,
we selected similar upcsf r o md i ﬀerent brands (but not necessarily diﬀerent manufacturers) to
comprise the diﬀerent retail price series within a category. For example, in bottled juices, we
selected a skus related to a particular size (64 oz.) and a particular type of juice (apple juice) for
each of the major brands. Selecting similar skus from the same store ensures that we are most
likely to observe price interactions where they exist. We selected only one retail price series per
brand. Though we consider retail prices, it is also possible to use wholesale pricing data to analyze
pricing behavior. We refrain from doing so for several reasons. First, many ﬁrms only have access
to retail prices, so the most useful approach for these ﬁrms will focus on retail prices. Second, the
wholesale data, by excluding retailer behavior, omits an important player of interest to many ﬁrms.
Third, in the Dominick’s data, the wholesale prices are not manufacturer prices to the retailer, but
rather reﬂect a weighted average cost of inventory. As such, it is not purged of retailer behavior,
because it includes the eﬀect of retail sales data and accounting procedures.
The number of price series per category ranged from 2 to 9. The 37 categories yielded 355 pairs
of price series. For the second stage analysis, we therefore have 355 pairs times 3 planning horizons,
or 1065 observations of coherence. The unit of analysis consists of upc prices at the store level.
Last, we note that there are a few missing observations scattered about in the data. When these
occur, we set the missing prices equal to those of the nearest period. This interpolation approach
ensures that prices more closely match the modal prices for regular and sale prices rather than
6http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/kilts/research/db/dominicks/
7Analgesics, bar soaps, bath soaps, candy bars, cereal, gum, soup, conditioners, cookies, cola, deoderant, ﬂoss,
fabric softener sheets, fabric softner liquids, frozen dinners, frozen entrees, frozen orange juice, graham crackers,
apple juice, liquid dish detergent, liquid laundry detergent, liquid soaps, oatmeal, refrigerated orange juice, paper
towels, toilet paper, razors, beer, saltines, shredded cheese, shaving cream, shampoo, sliced cheese, snack crackers,
toothbrushes, toothpaste, and tuna ﬁsh.
8some point in between.8 Exceptionally, the series for one upc are too short, for instance because
it is discontinued. In such cases, we resorted to an average of the prices for the most similar upcs
within brand. A sample graph of the upc level retail price series was presented in Figure 1.
4R e s u l t s
4.1 At which planning cycles do prices interact empirically?
Coherence: Figure 3 depicts the retail pricing coherence (averaged over brand pairs) for 4 il-
lustrative categories. The shredded cheese category evidences a sharp reduction in coherence at
the four week frequency, and negligible interaction in retail prices beyond 10 weeks. Cereal prices
have a very high coherence at about 2 1/2 weeks suggesting that the prices of competitors in the
cereal category are strongly correlated. In contrast, prices in the razor category evidence short-
and long-term interactions, while prices in the bath-soap category have high degrees of coherence
across all planning cycles. Additional variation in the nature of coherence exists across brand pairs
within categories. Collectively, the ﬁgure suggests that empirical interactions in price occur at very
diﬀerent cycle lengths. These patterns are reﬂective of patterns in the other categories as well. In
almost all of the 37 categories studied, the most important frequency of price interaction does not
coincide with the sample rate of the data (weekly).T h i sﬁnding is especially important given that
all analyses of competition, to our knowledge, focus on variation in price at the sampling rate of
the data (which is often weekly). These results further suggest that it is possible to broaden our
conception of pricing interactions by focusing on speciﬁc and theory-driven frequencies in the data.
–––— insert Figure 3 here –––—
To underscore the point that coherence manifests across frequencies, we plot, in Figure 4, the
5%, 25%, 50%, 75% and the 95% quantiles of the distribution of the mean coherences across all of
the brand pairs in the analysis for the retail pricing series. The 95% quantiles in Figure 4 indicates
that substantial coherence exists over all frequencies, and that spectral analysis is a useful approach
for divining these planning cycles. Moreover, as we will show, these frequencies play an important
8We also tried a c-spline interpolation, and the results were virtually identical. As the number of missing ob-
servations is small, alternative common methods of interpolation will probably have inconsequential eﬀects on our
results.
9role in inferences regarding the nature of competitive interactions. Next, we seek to assess whether
there is any systematic variation in the degree of coherence across brands, categories and time.
–––— insert Figure 4 here –––—
4.2 Do empirical interactions in price depend on the brand, category and plan-
ning horizon?
It is apparent from the forgoing analysis that there exists substantial variation in coherence across
brands, categories and time. We now explore the existence of patterns in coherence. In partic-
ular, we investigate whether our measures of price interaction are aﬀected by brand or category
characteristics. Such an analysis could be useful for researchers interested in ascertaining when or
whether periodicity is likely to matter. The list of descriptors considered is not exhaustive, but
rather reﬂects the conﬂuence of the measures available in the data, and prior ﬁndings in the pricing
literature.
4.2.1 Brand level inﬂuences on competitor price interactions
We commence by outlining several factors at the level of brand-pairs that are hypothesized to aﬀect
the pricing interactions. These brand-pair level variables (deﬁned in Appendix C ) are denoted,
zc
ii0 and they are as follows:
• Within Firm Eﬀects.R e ﬂective of common category planning practices, we expect manufac-
turers to price their skus similarly. This would lead to higher coherence among skus.
• Between Firm Eﬀects. Price and quality tiers can also aﬀect price interactions (Blattberg
and Wisniewski 1989; Bronnenberg and Wathieu 1996).
— Private Label. Given that private label store brands are often in diﬀerent quality tiers
than national brands (Hoch 1996), we expect coherence to be modest for brand pairs
that include a store brand.
— Price Diﬀerential.L e e ﬂang and Wittink’s (2001) survey of managers indicates that
competitor response is more likely when brands are positioned similarly. As such, one
might expect coherence to be limited for disparately priced brands.
104.2.2 Category Level Inﬂuences on Competitor Price Interactions
In addition to brand descriptors, we delineate a set of category descriptors, denoted by vc,t h a tw e
expect will moderate price interactions. These factors (again deﬁned in the Appendix C) and the
directions of our expectations regarding their eﬀects on price interactions, are as follows:
• can Industry Characteristics. We consider the following industry factors:
— Concentration. Chen et al. (1992) ﬁnd that absence of competitive response is more
likely with fewer competitors, as more competitors often implies a market of greater
strategic importance. This suggests that coherence should be lower in more concentrated
markets.
— Volatility. Highly volatile markets with a larger percentage of ﬁrms exiting and entering
the market can decrease the likelihood that organizations can monitor price activity and
this may reduce coherence in pricing.
• Consumer Characteristics. Increased consumer price sensitivity is indicative of lower switch-
ing costs and thus greater competitive threats. As such, higher price elasticities are associated
with a greater likelihood of competitive response (Kuester, Homburg, and Robertson 1999),
suggesting increased coherence in price. Leeﬂang and Wittink (2001) further ﬁnd that higher
cross-brand elasticities lead to greater price reactions.
— Penetration. Increased penetration has been associated with greater price sensitivity
(Narasimhan, Neslin and Sen 1996). If this association holds, we expect penetration to
contribute to an increase in coherence.
— Storability. Bell, Chiang, and Padmanabhan (1999) ﬁnd that increased storability leads
to increased price sensitivity.9 Thus, we expect coherence to increase in storability.
4.2.3 Regression Results
Table 1 presents the results of the coherence regression. Overall, the ﬁt of the model with the data
is good and the signiﬁcant results are consistent with our expectations. Several eﬀects merit spe-
9Other factors may inﬂuence price sensitivity as well (Bell et al. 1999). However, our attempts to measure them
via a survey approach yielded variables that are redundant with the information contained in the variables listed
above (for example, stockpilability was highly correlated with interpurchase time).
11cial consideration due to the novelty of the ﬁndings. In particular, consistent with the cospectrum
observed in Figure 4, we ﬁnd that coherence is more prevalent in the short run than the long run.
The result is consistent with Chen, Smith and Grimm (1992), who observe smaller reactions to
strategic, as opposed to tactical, actions (as strategic actions involve greater commitment of re-
sources over time). Further, Chen and MacMillan (1992) note that more irreversible decisions (e.g.,
regular price as opposed to temporary price) can lessen reactions. The eﬀect of same manufacturer
is positive and quite substantial, as manufacturers tend to coordinate prices of their brands within
a category. In addition, brand pairs with a large price diﬀerential show little interaction in pricing.
At the category level, we ﬁnd that more concentrated markets are contain brand pairs that have
lower coherence. This indicates that all else equal, the observed prices in concentrated markets
tend to be more independent. Storability is positively associated with coherence. This is because
storability makes it appealing to consumers to buy when prices are temporarily low. This increased
price sensitivity makes price reactions more eﬀective, raising coherence.
–––— insert Table 1 here –––—
Overall, we conclude that competitor price interactions vary systematically across time, brands,
and categories. Next, we argue that these frequency decompositions can be used as a pre-cursor to
the speciﬁcation and interpretation of models of pricing conduct. As correlation in prices does not
equate to strategic pricing interactions, we advocate the exploration of coherence in price cycles to
screen which planning cycles may be of importance for strategic analysis. In the next section, we
seek to demonstrate this point by showing that modeling alternative periodicities in the data leads
to diﬀerent inferences about competitive response.
5 Inferring competitive responses
5.1 Overview
So far we have argued that multiple decisions are represented in weekly pricing data and that
some of these decisions are associated with shorter and other with longer planning cycles and
reaction speeds. We have further shown that the empirical interaction of shelf prices diﬀers across
planning cycles and that for each price pair the dominant interaction does generally not occur at
the sample rate of the data. We now take our analysis a step further and show —again using spectral
12decomposition— that the impact of periodicity on statistical inferences about price setting can be
profound. To accomplish this goal, we ﬁrst theoretically outline how periodicity can matter and
then provide an empirical illustration to show this is the case.
Consider demand qi given by a linear function in own prices pi and competitive prices pj,j6= i,
qi = f(pi,p j). (2)
Assuming constant marginal cost ci, the ﬁrst order condition on proﬁt maximization is that
p∗







Substituting a linear demand equation for ease of exposition, where bii indicates an own-price








with bii < 0a n dbij > 0.
With Bertrand-Nash competition, all players take each other’s actions as given, i.e., a condition
for inference of Bertrand-Nash competition is ∂pj/∂pi =0 . On the other hand, if player i thinks
that raising its price will make player j do the same, then ∂pj/∂pi > 0. Given the signs of bii and
bij the latter condition is associated with higher margins, and is therefore taken as an indication of
“soft” competition or “cooperative” behavior. Conversely, ﬁnding that ∂pj/∂pi < 0 is associated
with lower margins and is taken as evidence of non-cooperative conduct.
Of interest is how pricing decisions at diﬀerent planning cycles aﬀect these inferences. One
particularly interesting case arises when price elasticities vary with the periodicity of prices. For
instance, promotional price response (and elasticity) is usually higher than regular price response
(Blattberg, Briesch and Fox 1995). Such a result might reﬂect consumers’ increased tendency to
stockpile in response to a temporary price reduction relative to a regular price decrease (Krishna
1994). To assess the impact of this diﬀerence on the inferred competitive response, we point out
that a ﬁrms’ proﬁt margins are invariant to whether data used are quarterly or weekly. This
condition is unnecessary but simpliﬁes the argument. From equation (3) and (4) it then follows
that the empirical estimate for the sum bii + bij · (∂pj/∂pi) is invariant to whether the weekly or
quarterly information in the data is used (i.e., the same margin is estimated). If bii is more negative
with weekly data than with quarterly data, then bij ·(∂pj/∂pi) needs to be more positive. Then, if
13the increase in own price response is larger than the increase in cross-price response, ∂pj/∂pi will
be estimated with a higher value from high-frequency data (when demand is more elastic) than
from low-frequency data. Thus, estimating the system on weekly data will lead to inferences of
more cooperative conduct than on the quarterly data. Though we focus on bii, it is important to
note the argument generalizes to other parameters of interest in the model — as any parameter can
change with the periodicity (e.g., retailer, consumer or manufacturer conduct), this increases the
likelihood that inferences regarding competitive conduct can change with periodicity, and ampliﬁes
our core contention that periodicity matters.
The intuition behind our argument is that under Bertrand-Nash competition margins should
shrink when price sensitivity increases. Under the assumptions communicated above the only way
in which the system of equations in equation (3) and (4) can deal with the equality of margins
across regimes of diﬀerent frequencies and price responses in weekly or quarterly data is to infer
more cooperation when price response is high. Therefore, under such conditions, there appears be a
tendency toward inferring “collusion” or “cooperative conduct” from high frequency high elasticity
data.10
To illustrate these points, we adopt a speciﬁcation for f(pi,pj) similar to Kadiyali et al. (2000).
As with Kadiyali et al. (2000, p. 132), we ﬁnd the log-log, semi-log, and linear demand models
to be quite comparable in ﬁt. While the semi-log model enables separate identiﬁcation of each of
the conduct parameters, our goal is to show competitive interactions can diﬀer across planning
horizons, and a linear model is suﬃcient for this purpose. Like Kadiyali et al. (2000), we choose
a category with two national brands and a private label; shredded cheese. The shredded cheese
category was selected because (1) it evidences a diﬀerence in coherence patterns in the long term
and short term, (2) the number of brands is low (2 major national brands and 1 private label),
thus facilitating estimation of the structural model, and (3) because we have exact knowledge of
the variable costs in this category through consultation with a former category manager of one of
the major ﬁrms in the industry.
10Rather crucially, this statement builds on the scenario that the only thing that changes across data of diﬀerent
f r e q u e n c i e si so w np r i c er e s p o n s ebii. Although this “all else equal” condition substantively holds in our empirical
example, we do not wish to suggest it holds in general. Still, if inferences about other parameters change across data
of diﬀerent frequency, it would be a coincidence if the inference about the responses ∂pj/∂pi remained unaﬀected.
14We specify the demand for brand i to be given by
qi = ai + bip1 + cip2 + dip3 + gi · ddshifti (5)
where p1 is the price of Kraft Shredded Cheese, p2 is the price of Sargento Shredded Cheese, and
p3 is the price of store brand shredded cheese. The demand shifters (ddshifti)w eu s ei n c l u d e
the total demand of competing brands in the outside stores (i.e., stores other than the one used
in estimation) and monthly dummies. It can be shown (see Appendix D) that the estimation
equations for shredded cheese are thus given by
q1 = a1 + b1p1 + c1p2 + d1p3 + g1 · ddshift1
q2 = a1 + b2p1 + c2p2 + d2p3 + g2 · ddshift2
q3 = a3 + b3p1 + c3p2 + d3p3 + g3 · ddshift3
mp1 = mc1 + γ1q1
mp2 = mc2 + γ2q2 (6)
r1 = α1q1 + α2r2 + α3r3
r2 = α4q2 + α5r2 + α6r3
r3 = α7q3 + α8r2 + α9r3
where mpi is the manufacturer price of brand i ∈ {1,2,3}, mci is the manufacturer cost, and ri is
the retailer mark-up.
It is also shown in Appendix C that deviations from the Nash condition in the manufacturer
pricing equations (mpi)i sg i v e nb yki = −(1/γi)−bi 6=0 ,i∈ {1,2}. Given estimates for the mean
and variance of γi and bi, it is possible to obtain estimates for the variance of ki, and therefore
test for deviations from Nash. The system of equations in 6 are estimated using linear three-stage
least-squares (3SLS), with the lagged prices and quantities in outside stores as well as the store
under investigation as instruments.
5.2 Inferences at Alternative Planning Cycles
Our ﬁrst consideration in this example is to ascertain what frequencies to use in our analysis. We
used spectral analysis to determine that the best empirical decomposition is obtained around a
frequency less than and equal to 4 weeks and a frequency more than 4 weeks (see also Leeﬂang
15and Wittink (1992) for a theoretical rationale as well as the empirical data in Figure 3).11 We
then ﬁltered the shredded cheese category to select these frequency components for analysis (see
Hamilton 1994). We employ a low pass ﬁlter and next a high pass ﬁlter to separate the two
frequency components.
The key parameter estimates from the structural model are presented in Table 2, and the
own- and cross-price coeﬃcients exhibit face validity. We focus our discussion on the inferences
about manufacturer pricing rules to illustrate that diﬀerences in competitive response can exist
over planning horizons. From Table 2 we observe that own price sensitivity is higher in the high
frequency than in the low frequency data. Further, we also observe that the cross price sensitivity
does not increase with high frequency data as much. A potential explanation for this pattern is
that the lion-share of the short term price eﬀect comes from shifting demand around in time rather
than across brands.
–––— insert Table 2 here –––—
A necessary condition for a Bertrand-Nash interaction is that k1 = −(1/γ1)−b1,k 2 = −(1/γ2)−
b1 = 0. To explicitly test for deviations from Nash, we calculate the ki and its variance using the
delta method. Table 3 presents these results. Using the low frequencies in the data, we would infer
that the manufacturers compete in a Nash equilibrium, as ki is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0
for either national brand. On the other hand, using the high frequency data, we would infer that
the game deviates signiﬁcantly from Nash, as ki > 0 for both national brands. Thus, as expected,
our inference about competition depends strongly on which frequencies in the data are used for
analysis. The diﬀerences between long and short run are signiﬁcant at t =9 .16 for k1 and at
t =3 .19 for k2, with cooperation being greater in the short run.
–––— insert Table 3 here –––—
The ﬁndings are consistent with our speculation that higher price response bii, all else constant,
tends to lead to an inference of more cooperative behavior. As our estimates for own price response
for the national brands are 30-90% higher for high frequency data, this implies that the inferred
level of cooperation should be higher. This is precisely what we observe. The ﬁnding of short-
term pricing cooperation is also consistent with Lal (1990) who shows that leading brands collude
11We also used decompositions below and above 13 weeks with the same results as presented here.
16through their promotions to lock out lower quality brands. We note that implicit collusion in short-
term pricing is possible when manufacturers learn about promotion schedules in advance from the
retailer.
In sum, we conclude that our inferences about the nature of the competitive game varies with
the periodicity and that more cooperative conduct is inferred with the high frequency data than
with the low frequency data. Thus, we demonstrate that it is possible to isolate frequencies of
high pricing interactions as inputs for a more structured approach to competitive price analysis.
One alternative to our analysis would be to include a discount variable in the supply and demand
equations to capture the diﬀerent goals of regular and discount pricing, and we think this would
be a useful extension. However, even with such an approach, it is not clear in which frequency or
frequencies pricing variation should predominate.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We presented a literature that suggests that price data reﬂect multiple decisions and multiple
decision makers such as retailers and manufacturers, and that these decisions manifest as diﬀerent
pricing interactions across diﬀerent planning horizons. This literature, therefore, suggests that a
single pricing series can exhibit multiple interactions across diﬀerent frequencies. Using the beer
category example, we illustrated that high and low frequency price changes interact diﬀerently
across competitors. We then formalized this illustration by applying a spectral decomposition to the
data in order to uncover the frequencies at which competitor price interactions are most intense. We
depicted results for 4 additional categories and found that multiple competitor interactions across
pricing frequencies seem prevalent. Next, using data on 37 categories, we generalized these results.
We found that competitor interactions, as measured by coherence, do not predominate at the
sampling rate of the data. Rather, we ﬁnd that signiﬁcant competitor price interactions occur across
all planning horizons, be they weekly, monthly, or quarterly. We further demonstrate systematic
diﬀerences in price interactions across brands and categories, noting that pricing interactions are
more prevalent in the short-term, within a given manufacturer’s brand portfolio, within price tiers,
in less concentrated markets, and in categories that are storable.
We then demonstrated, both theoretically and empirically, that inferences regarding competi-
tive responses require some notion of what constitutes a plausible decision cycle. Using a structural
17modeling approach estimated at diﬀerent planning horizons in the shredded cheese category, we
showed that inferences about the nature of competition can deviate signiﬁcantly across planning
horizons. In particular, we ﬁnd that increased price response, all else equal, tends to favor inferences
of cooperation. As such, we envision the spectral approach considered herein to be a useful precur-
sor and complement to more structural approaches for competitive inference. We provide empirical
proof for the conjecture that a modeler’s choices about periodicity in pricing inﬂuence assessments
about competitive interaction. We conclude that choices about periodicity ideally combine a spec-
tral exploration of the data with theory about price response, and a modeler’s knowledge about
managerial constraints in the timing of competitive reactions. Given the inﬂuence of periodicity
on the inference of primitives such as marginal cost or the nature of competitive interactions, it is
important to properly account for this phenomenon when developing managerial insights into these
factors.
There is little doubt that studies on price competition will be of continuing importance in the
future. Above all, we hope that the research herein is taken as a constructive step in the direction
of studying the periodicity of price decision making. Beyond that domain, we hope that spectral




Same Manufacturer 0.70 6.30 ∗∗
Private Label 0.03 0.25
Price Diﬀerential -0.15 -3.14 ∗∗
Category Level Variables
Concentration -1.88 -3.23 ∗∗
Volatility -0.42 -1.21
Penetration -0.00 -0.32
Storability 0.33 2.83 ∗∗
Planning Horizon -1.15 -14.86 ∗∗
Intercept -0.66 -0.87
R2 0.49
aNegative eﬀects denote lower coherence
∗p<0.05, ∗∗p<0.01
Table 1: Estimation results for coherence
19low frequency high frequency
Parameter Value t Value t
Demand equations
Kraft Demand
Price Kraft (b1) -1568.12 -14.00 -2928.24 -27.30
Price Sargento (c1) 928.11 5.70 1010.44 4.64
Price Dominicks (d1) 1119.68 6.93 -169.20 -0.95
Sargento Demand
Price Kraft (b2) 927.19 8.40 536.20 4.11
Price Sargento (c2) -1505.25 -10.35 -2005.80 -16.97
Price Dominicks (d2) -19.47 -0.15 -90.98 -0.77
Dominicks Demand
Price Kraft (b3) 1496.32 5.40 1706.18 3.75
Price Sargento (c3) 1012.72 2.71 -485.72 -0.84
Price Dominicks (d3) -4113.34 -13.13 -4766.57 -10.78
Manufacturer pricing rules
Kraft Rule
Quantity Kraft (γ1) 0.000582 30.41 0.000608 36.09
Sargento Rule
Quantity Sargento (γ2) 0.000694 32.20 0.000777 50.93
Retailer Pricing Rules
Kraft Rule
Quantity Kraft (a1) -0.00017 -15.49 -0.00014 -21.29
Markup Sargento (a2) 0.728 10.72 0.276 4.60
Markup Dominicks (a3) 0.245 4.73 0.031 0.69
Sargento Rule
Quantity Sargento (a4) -0.00014 -14.94 -0.00012 -13.00
Markup Kraft (a5) 0.390 11.23 0.170 3.47
Markup Dominicks (a6) 0.226 6.31 -0.079 -1.84
Dominick’s Rule
Quantity Dominicks (a7) -0.00009 -15.39 -0.00008 -19.52
Markup Kraft (a8) 0.248 4.88 0.069 1.23
Markup Sargento (a9) 0.640 9.20 0.003 0.04
System-weighted R2 0.73 0.70
Table 2: Structural model results
low frequency high frequency
Parameter Value t Value t
k1 -150.09 -1.44 1283.50 11.00
k2 64.33 0.39 718.80 5.95
Table 3: Manufacturing pricing rule parameters






































Figure 1: Weekly prices for Budweiser and Old Milwaukee






















Figure 2: The distribution of coherence between Budweiser and Old Milwaukee




























































































Figure 3: Average coherence for the brand pairs of four diﬀerent categories






















Figure 4: The distribution of coherence across all brand pairs over multiple planning periods.
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27AE s t i m a t i o n o f S p e c t r a l M o d e l
We employ the following procedure to obtain the spectral decomposition of the retail pricing series.
The discussion is topical. For more detail, interested readers are referred to Harvey (1975), or for
a more advanced treatment, Hamilton (1994).
1. Diﬀerence the data. Trends are similar to very low frequency cycles (because trends are akin
to long-term price movements with an inﬁnite cycle duration). As such, trends increase the apparent
power of the lower frequencies in the data, and can lead to spurious low frequency signals in the data
(Chan, Hayya, and Ord 1977; Harvey and Jaeger 1993; Nelson and Kang 1981). Moreover, spectral
analysis is predicated upon the assumption that the data are stationary. Augmented Dickey-Fuller
tests on the price series in our data indicate that this is often not the case. For these reasons,
we apply a ﬁrst diﬀerencing ﬁlter to the data. The coherence, gain, and phase relationships are
invariant to ﬁltering when the same linear ﬁlter is applied to all the series (see Fishman 1969,
Hassler 1993). Hence, ﬁrst diﬀerencing does not impact the measures of coherence, gain and phase.
We note that diﬀerencing the data has the advantages of (1) increasing the likelihood that the
series are stationary, (2) ﬁltering the zero frequency, (3) preserving the coherence, phase and gain
relationships, and (4) controlling for linear trends in price (including linear inﬂation trends).12
2. Estimate a var model. For all prices yict, for brands i =1 ,...,K c, in a category c =1 ,...,C,






Ψcs · yct−s + ect (A.1)
where P is the number of lags. The coeﬃcients of this model, Ψcs, are used to compute the
spectral decomposition. Given that regular price changes often show little or no variation for up
to six months, we allow for very long lag-shifts of up to 26 weeks (i.e., P = 26). We allow for
this ﬂexibility because we wish to explore the longer term price interactions for which lower-order
var models may be less appropriate. On the other hand, the higher order var models yields an
impractical number of parameters. There is a Kc×Kc coeﬃcient matrix Ψ to be estimated for each
lag. With 5 brands and 26 periods, this would yield more than 600 parameters. This empirical
task is impossible, as the number of observations is insuﬃcient to estimate such a large number
of parameters. Accordingly, we follow the standard practice of zeroing parameters with t-statistics
less than 1.5 (similar to Dekimpe and Hanssens 1999).13 We proceed in phases, by ﬁrst estimating
12I ti si m p o r t a n tt on o t et h a td i ﬀerencing the data controls for linear trends in inﬂation in costs and prices.
However, ingredient costs in food may be seasonal, and also impact our results. If coherence is driven by costs, we
will observe a seasonal peak of 6 or 12 months in the data. We do not observe these peaks.
13We also used a cut-oﬀ of t=1.0 to assess the sensitivity of our results to assess the sensitivity of our results to
the inclusion of more parameters. The results remained essentially identical.
28a var model of order 1, and then retaining the parameters with t-statistics greater than 1.5. We
then add a second lag, and repeat the process. This process continues until all P lags are added to
the model.
3. Compute the spectrum and cospectrum. The spectrum can be interpreted as the proportion
of the variance in a price series attributable to a certain frequency. Higher power indicates greater
price variation at a given frequency. The cospectrum is then analogous to the covariance, and
measures the degree of covariation between two series at a given frequency. We use the coeﬃcient
matrices Ψcs to compute the complete power spectrum (Hamilton 1994). Deﬁning Ωe = E(ecte0
ct),























−1. In our empirical work, the complex matrix Sc(ω) is computed at discrete ω =
[0,0.01π,0.02π,...,π], and the resulting series {Sc(ω) | ω =0 ,...,π} deﬁnes what is known as the
power spectrum. Unlike power spectrums estimated from bi-variate var models, our approach
controls for the observed eﬀects of all other brands’ prices,b e c a u s et h evar is estimated on the full
set of prices.
4. Compute the coherence and phase. Deﬁne for each pair of brands ic and i0














where im{arg} is the imaginary part, and re{arg} is the real part of its arguments. The factor qc
ii0
is called the “quadrature” and cc















Note that the coherence measure is symmetric — it is analogous to an R2 measure in regression
and measures the strength of association between two series at diﬀerent frequencies (i.e., planning
horizons).
5. Compute the moments of coherence. We note that there is no conﬁdence interval around
(A.4). To approximate such an interval, we generate 1000 draws from the sampling distribution
of the estimated var parameters of equation (A.1), and use these draws to obtain an empirical
distribution for the power spectrum, and the resulting measure in equation (A.4). For instance,
29the distributions underlying the box-plots in Figure 2 are computed from the 1000 replications of
the spectral decompositions of the 1000 randomly drawn var models. This procedure enables one
to ascertain which frequencies are associated with tightly distributed coherences.
B Estimation Of Cross-time, Brand and Category Eﬀects
After collecting the coherences across planning horizons p = {0,1,2} , brand pairs ii0 =1 ,...,N c,
and categories c =1 ,...C, we then estimate the following regressions for coherence,
hii0cp = δ0h + v0
cαh + z0
ii0c0βh + γhp + εii0c + ηcp + ξii0cp, (B.1)
where p is planning horizon and the same manufacturer indicator variable is denoted, zc
ii0.14 The
ηcp are within category/horizon random eﬀects, the εii0c are within brand-pair eﬀects, and the ξii0cp
are the observational errors. We specify these random eﬀects to account for potential correlations
across observations within the same time horizon and category as well as within the same brand pair
across time horizons (as, strictly speaking, these coherence estimates are not independent replicates,
and failure to accommodate correlations among these repeated measures might overstate the power
of the ﬁxed eﬀects). We specify ξii0cp ∼ IIDN(0,σ2
ξ), ηcp ∼ IIDN(0,σ2
η), and εiic0 ∼ IIDN(0,σ2
ε0)
and assume these three errors to be independent.
Thus, the component of the covariance structure of the within category covariation of coherence




































∀c Nc. To obtain the covariance matrix for the system stacked across brand-pairs,
categories, and planning horizons we combine Λ with the brand-pair random eﬀects. The resulting
covariance matrix is given by
Ω = I3 ⊗ Λ−1 + σ2
ει3ι0
3 ⊗ IN , (B.3)
where I3 is a 3-dimensional identity matrix, IN is an N-dimensional identity matrix and ι3ι0
3 is a 3
x3m a t r i xo fo n e s .Ω is thus dimensioned 3N × 3N.




Deﬁne eii0cp = hii0cp − δ0h + v0
cαh + z0
ii0c0βh + γhp. Array these residuals across brand pairs and
categories, so that we obtain an N × 1 vector ep, and let the N × 3m a t r i xu ≡ [ e0 e1 e2 ].










14G i v e nt h a tc o h e r e n c ei sc o n s t r a i n e dt ol i eb e t w e e n0a n d1 ,w eu s et h el o g i s t i ct r a n s f o r mo fc o h e r e n c ei n
our analysis of the eﬀect of brand and category characteristics on coherence. This transformation is given by
ln(hii0(ω)/(1 − hii0(ω))). Also note that the transform is taken before any sample moments are computed.
30After taking the log of the likelihood and simplifying (Magnus 1982), the log-likelihood function
can be written as (ignoring an irrelevant constant),
lnL(θ)=−0.5 · ln|Ω| +0 .5 · trace(u0 · Λ−1 · u) − 0.5 · trace(u0 · B · u · A)) , (B.5)
where A = 1
3ι3ι0
3, B = Λ−1−(Λ+3σ2
εIN)−1, and the log of the determinant can be shown to equal














Note that the log-likelihood when expressed in this form requires only an inversion of a block
diagonal N × N matrix, which is much smaller than Ω. Estimation proceeds by maximizing
equation (B.5) over θ.
C Variable Operationalization
The variables in Table 1 are operationalized as follows. Same manufacturer is an indicator variable
that assumes the value of one if the two brands are produced by the same manufacturer, and 0
otherwise. Note, the same manufacturer is not equivalent to the same brand. Private label is an
indicator variable that assumes the value of one of the brands is a store brand. Price diﬀerential
reﬂects the mean per unit absolute price diﬀerence over time. Price diﬀerential was based upon
standardized series in order to make the variables comparable across categories (as units of volume
diﬀer across categories).
Concentration is measured as the Herﬁndahl index. Volatility is deﬁned as the sum of manu-
facturer births and deaths in the data expressed as a fraction of the number of manufacturers. A
birth is determined by the appearance of a manufacturer sometime over the duration of the data.
A death is determined by the disappearance of a manufacturer prior to the end of the data. Each
of these is converted to a percent by dividing by the total number of manufacturers. Penetration
(as the percent of consumers using the category) is obtained from the IRI factbook. Storability is
r a t e do nas c a l eo f1 - 7v i aas u r v e yd i s t r i b u t e dto students in a large MBA program. Table C.1
outlines summary statistics for these variables.
31Table C.1 - Variable Means
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Brand Variables
Same Manufacturer 0.14 0.35
Private Label 0.20 0.40




Penetration 71.02 2 .3
Storability 4.96 0.56
DS p e c i ﬁc a t i o na n dE s t i m a t i o no fS t r u c t u r a lM o d e l
We use the following demand equations for three brands (ignoring demand shifters for sake of
explication),
qi = ai + bip1 + cip2 + dip3. (D.1)
Then proﬁts for brand 1 are then given by (mp1 − mc1)q where mp1 is the manufacturer price
of brand 1, and mc1 is the manufacturer cost. The derivative with respect to p1 is given by
(mp1 − mc1)0q1 +( mp1 − mc1)q0
1.T h i s i m p l i e s ( mp1 − mc1)(b1(∂p1/∂mp1)+c1(∂p2/∂mp1)+
d1(∂p3/∂mp1)) + q1 =0 .N o t i n gt h a tp1 = mp1 + r1 where p is retail price and r is markup, then
(mp1−mc1)(b1(1+∂r1/∂mp1)+c1(∂p2/∂mp1)+d1(∂p3/∂mp1))+q1 = 0. Setting ∂r1/∂mp1 = t1,
∂p2/∂mp1 = t2,a n d∂p3/∂mp1 = t3 implies mp1 = mc1 − q1(b1 + b1t1 + c1t2 + d1t3)−1. When t1,
t2,a n dt3 are 0, we observe Nash, however these parameters are not separately identiﬁed. Setting
k1 = b1t1 + c1t2 + d1t3 we obtain mp1 = mc1 − q1(b1 + k1)−1.T h u s ,i fk1 diﬀers from 0, the game
is not Nash (Kadiyali et al 2000). Note that k1 = 0 is a necessary but not suﬃcient condition for
Nash. Setting k1 = −(1/γ1) − b1 yields
mp1 = mc1 + γ1q1 (D.2)
which is the estimation equation. After estimating γ1 and b1,t h ev a r i a n c eo fk1 can be inferred
using the delta method. A similar equation holds for the other brands. Note that γ is a measure
of relative margins inasmuch as the manufacturer margin, mp1 − mc1 = γ1q1.







3 =0 .T h u s ,q1+r1(b1(∂mp1/∂r1+1)+c1∂mp2/∂r1+d1∂mp3/∂r1)+
r2(b2(∂mp1/∂r1+1)+c2∂mp2/∂r1+d2∂mp3/∂r1)+r3(b3(∂mp1/∂r1+1)+c3∂mp2/∂r1+d3∂mp3/∂r1)=
0. Again, noting we can not separately identify the conduct parameters, we obtain r1 = −(b1 +
k4)−1q1 − (b2 + k5)(b1 + k4)−1r2 − (b3 + k6)(b1 + k4)−1r3 where k4 = b1∂mp1/∂r1 + c1∂mp2/∂r1 +
d1∂mp3/∂r1, k5 = b2∂mp1/∂r1+c2∂mp2/∂r1+d2∂mp3/∂r1,a n dk6 = b3∂mp1/∂r1+c3∂mp2/∂r1+
d3∂mp3/∂r1.W h e n k4,k 5,k 6 = 0, this is Nash (Kadiyali et al. 2000). Setting k4 =( −1 −
32α1b1)/α1,k 5 = −b2 −α2(b1 +k4)=−b2 +α2/α1,a n dk6 = −b3 −α3(b1 +k4)=−b3 −α3/α1 yields
the estimation equation,
r1 = α1q1 + α2r2 + α3r3 (D.3)
which is linear. Equations (D.1-D.3) together form the system in equation (6)
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